Virtue ethics and the likelihood of invertebrate suffering by Lockwood, Jeffrey A.
Lockwood, Jeffrey A. (2020) Virtue ethics and the likelihood of invertebrate 
suffering. Animal Sentience 29(12) 
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1601 
This article has appeared in the journal Animal Sentience, 
a peer-reviewed journal on animal cognition and feeling. It 
has been made open access, free for all, by WellBeing 
International and deposited in the WBI Studies 
Repository. For more information, please contact 
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org. 
Animal Sentience 2020.341:  Lockwood on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds 
1 
 
Virtue ethics and the likelihood of invertebrate suffering 
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds 
 
 
Jeffrey A. Lockwood 
Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, University of Wyoming 
 
Abstract:  Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) review evidence that invertebrates have the capacity to 
suffer. If they do, then, according to utilitarians (those advocating “the greatest good for the 
greatest number”) and deontologists (those advocating rights and corresponding duties), research 
practices and funding policies should be required to protect invertebrates. But if the evidence is 
mistaken, then, according to utilitarians and deontologists, our constraints would be unjustified 
and even morally suspect. Virtue ethicists, in contrast, endorse acting rationally in an effort to 
cultivate the virtues — even if the basis for our action is mistaken. Virtue ethics seems more 
compelling than the problematic assumptions and vague requirements of the Animal Sentience 
Precautionary Principle (Birch 2017). 
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1. Pascal’s Wager with Invertebrate Minds. Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) provide a 
thorough review of the literature on the likelihood of invertebrate suffering. They contend that 
logical consistency compels us to take seriously the need for moral constraints on how we treat 
invertebrates. Their argument, from the perspective of the moral agent (i.e., humans), can be 
represented as a modified table of Pascal’s Wager: 
 
 Invertebrates suffer Invertebrates do not suffer 
You believe  Avoid unethical actions No loss to you 
You do not believe  Perform unethical actions No reward for you 
 
This is helpful but incomplete as an ethical theory. M&P allude to two frameworks: utilitarianism 
(i.e., ethics is a matter of producing the greatest good for the greatest number, with “good” 
including pain and suffering but sometimes also so-called higher subjective experiences) and 
deontology (i.e., ethics is a matter of respecting the rights of others by acting in accord with one’s 
duties which are classically understood as rules that apply to all rational beings). Both ethical 
theories would align with the “harm principle” and consider suffering as the minimum standard 
for moral consideration. The Pascalian version can be interpreted from both these ethical 
perspectives as entailing a duty to avoid causing unnecessary suffering to invertebrates. However, 
this assumes that invertebrates have morally relevant states of being which include, at least, the 
capacity to suffer (whether or not they have other morally relevant states such as self-awareness, 
experience of particular emotions, formulation of future plans that can be frustrated, or 
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enjoyment of higher-order intellectual pursuits). What if this is not true, and we mistakenly adopt 
inconvenient and costly measures? For the deontologist, we may have failed to fulfill legitimate 
duties (e.g., conducting research that would benefit humans and other sentient animals), and for 
the utilitarian, we will have wasted resources in protecting organisms whose condition does not 
contribute to the greater good.  
A third moral theory — virtue ethics — can justify acting with moral concern for 
invertebrates, even if it is based on invalid evidence (i.e., inferring that invertebrates suffer when, 
in fact, they do not). If M&P have provided sufficient evidence that invertebrates suffer, this has 
important implications for this third moral theory. The Pascal table overlooks that falsely believing 
(what M&P refer to as a “false positive”) may still yield substantial ethical benefit to moral agents 
(i.e., ourselves) from the perspective of virtue ethics.  
 
2. The Virtuous Treatment of Insects. Virtue ethics requires that we cultivate particular character 
traits (virtues) while avoiding others (vices) in order to fully realize our human potential, thereby 
knowing and doing what is right. I have argued that avoiding gratuitous harm to insects could 
foster the virtues of compassion and helpfulness, but I also conceded that we don’t really know 
whether insects warrant such consideration (Lockwood 2016). It is here that virtue ethics has a 
significant advantage over utilitarianism or deontology in its capacity to sidestep the epistemic 
problem. By this I mean that we now have good evidence of invertebrate suffering but we do not 
know for sure (knowledge being justified, true belief) whether our inference is correct. Our belief 
is justified, but could well be mistaken. Whether it is true becomes quite another issue, and given 
the problems of understanding the mental or subjective states of other beings (particularly those 
so different from ourselves), we may never be assured that invertebrates suffer. However, even 
if we cannot know or we are mistaken, virtue ethics provides a moral justification for acting in 
accordance with the belief that invertebrates suffer. 
The key lies in the path to virtue — practice. Through repetition, we live out the virtues 
until they become our very nature, at which point our actions are moral. Even if we are mistaken 
as to whether invertebrates feel pain, as long as our beliefs about their lives are reasonable, 
refraining from harming them constitutes a virtuous practice. And it is in regard to this crucial 
condition — holding rational beliefs — that M&P’s review of the scientific literature is vital. 
Everyday interactions with invertebrates provide ideal opportunities to cultivate virtue. 
We can develop positive character traits (e.g., empathy, compassion, and gentleness) through our 
frequent encounters with these creatures. Furthermore, invertebrates stretch our virtuous 
capacities by being alien, frightful or disgusting — qualities that M&P note are poor reasons for 
rejecting ethical obligations toward other beings. It is easy to resist harming kittens, so avoiding 
that vice offers little challenge and hence limited potential for refining our virtues. However, 
choosing to step over an ant on the sidewalk, refraining from spraying a grasshopper in the 
garden, opening a window to let an annoying fly escape, or removing a wayward spider from the 
basement requires far greater consideration.  
 
3. Policies and Practices. If practice makes perfect, then surely policies regarding the ethical 
treatment of invertebrates by research and funding institutions (a central concern of M&P, rather 
than a general, public disposition) have the capacity to require reflective interactions with 
invertebrates and in so doing, to cultivate virtue.  
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For example, by choosing not to harm invertebrates heedlessly, scientists manifest the 
Aristotelian virtue of temperance (sōphrosunē) (Curzer 1997). Although the ancients were 
concerned with moderation of bodily pleasures, a policy requiring researchers to take into 
account the condition of invertebrates would stimulate reasoned analysis and forbearance. For 
example, an investigator would need to balance the convenience, if not the pleasure, of forgoing 
anesthetic prior to cutting into a subject or of discounting the rearing conditions of a colony versus 
the likelihood of invertebrate suffering.  
Encounters with invertebrates in the laboratory or field provide the chance to practice 
self-restraint — and a thoughtfully crafted policy could foster such opportunities. Aristotle argued 
that this capacity was vital to developing the virtues (Toner 2003). Researchers and their 
institutions ought to exhibit rational deliberation, which is a commonly stated, if not invariantly 
applied, standard of science. As noted by M&P, invertebrates elicit irrational responses, and these 
culturally endorsed judgments form the indefensible and implicit basis of the “invertebrate 
dogma” — the outdated biases that continue to shape the policies of research and funding 
agencies.  
Returning to the matter of our uncertainty regarding the subjective experiences of 
invertebrates, M&P critique Birch’s (2017) Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle. They 
contend that it is both promising and flawed due to dubious biological assumptions, the problem 
of underdetermination, and the potential costs of overgeneralization. Although virtue ethics 
doesn’t fully avoid these concerns, this framework might be a better starting point for developing 
and defending practices to avoid the mistreatment of invertebrate animals. At least this ethical 
theory provides a sound basis for acting “as if” these creatures can suffer in the face of 
uncertainty. 
Although Aristotle did not specifically consider the virtue of epistemic humility (i.e., a 
humbleness regarding what we think we know), he advocated alētheia or truthfulness about 
one’s abilities and accomplishments. As M&P cogently argue: “we are not in a position to rule out 
or even deem unlikely the possibility that tiny brains can give rise to sentient lives with interests 
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